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Abstract—Cyber insurance is a key component in risk manage-
ment, intended to transfer risks and support business recovery
in the event of a cyber incident. As cyber insurance is still a new
concept in practice and research, there are many unanswered
questions regarding the data and economic models that drive
it, the coverage options and pricing of premiums, and its more
procedural policy-related aspects. This paper aims to address
some of these questions by focusing on the key types of data
which are used by cyber-insurance practitioners, particularly
for decision-making in the insurance underwriting and claim
processes. We further explore practitioners’ perceptions of the
challenges they face in gathering and using data, and identify
gaps where further data is required. We draw our conclusions
from a qualitative study by conducting a focus group with a
range of cyber-insurance professionals (including underwriters,
actuaries, claims specialists, breach responders, and cyber oper-
ations specialists) and provide valuable contributions to existing
knowledge. These insights include examples of key data types
which contribute to the calculation of premiums and decisions on
claims, the identification of challenges and gaps at various stages
of data gathering, and initial perspectives on the development of
a pre-competitive dataset for the cyber insurance industry. We
believe an improved understanding of data gathering and usage
in cyber insurance, and of the current challenges faced, can be
invaluable for informing future research and practice.
Index Terms—Cyber Insurance, Cyber risk, Underwriting,
Claims, Cybersecurity, Focus Groups, Cyber Security, User
Studies
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Cybersecurity incidents are now commonplace, with attack-
ers targeting everyone from individuals to organisations and
governments. To protect against attacks, there are a variety
of security controls, focused across the traditional areas of
prevention, detection and reaction. These are a core part of
cybersecurity risk management and can additionally support
cyber resilience practices [15, 28, 32]. Cyber insurance features
within risk management and is a mechanism for organisations
to share or transfer some of the risk they face. For instance,
an organisation may purchase insurance to be covered against
a data breach, and retain help recovering costs or mitigating
losses related to it (e.g., customer notification expenses, busi-
ness interruption from computer network downtime, incident
This paper is a preprint that has been accepted to IEEE Cyber Science 2020,
International Conference on Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics and
Assessment (CyberSA).
response and costs for system restoration). As a result, cyber
insurance has become increasingly popular, and has featured in
a range of industry and government reports/activities including
those from Marsh, AXIS, AON, Hiscox, Deloitte, the EastWest
Institute, ENISA and OECD [2, 14, 16, 20, 25, 26, 30, 34].
In this paper, we seek to better understand the cyber
insurance process and thereby provide new insights into an
area where there is arguably a dearth of research based on
views and experience of cyber-insurance practitioners. Our
aim is to develop an understanding of the crucial role that
the types of data used in cyber insurance play in decision-
making during the cyber-risk underwriting and insurance claim
processes. To complement this, we also look at gaps that
practitioners perceive that exist in current data-gathering and
usage processes, and explore the topic of a pre-competitive
dataset. Such a dataset could be the cornerstone for the entire
cyber insurance industry in the attempt to fill gaps in data-
gathering processes for underwriting and claim policies.
Given our aim, this work involves a qualitative study, and
in particular a focus group with a range of experienced cyber
insurers from underwriting, actuarial services, claims, breach
response, and cyber operations. Through this study, we outline
a series of key data points which can further inform current
discussions and analytics in cyber insurance, while also paving
the way for future research (on which new data points may
be needed to provide more effective and efficient insurance
underwriting and claims processes).
While cyber insurance has featured in research for at least
two decades (with seminal works including [7, 10, 22, 24]),
numerous open challenges still exist in research and practice.
These span several issues across the field; for instance, there
are the complexities of measuring, modelling and predicting
cyber risk (especially given the evolving nature of cyber
attacks, non-standard architectures of targets, and growing
instances of ‘silent cyber’) [5, 11, 23, 27, 40, 42]. Beyond those
more technical aspects, there are also difficulties in under-
standing the decisions driving the insurance underwriting and
claims processes, including those relating to security control
recommendations [29, 36, 38, 41]. Furthermore, we must not
overlook the reality of a lack of awareness about cyber
insurance, social insurance stigmas, and general negative
perceptions [4, 12, 13, 25, 31]. Such negative perceptions can
inhibit the uptake of cyber insurance policies, and are boosted
2by the rejection of large cyber claims by insurance companies,
which has already started to occur [39].
In one of the most recent, comprehensive and systematic
reviews of cyber insurance, Dambra et al. [11] highlight that
although the field has made some notable strides (in areas
such as game theory, economics and risk management), there
are several open issues in risk prediction, automated data
collection, catastrophe modelling and digital forensics. A core
theme across all of these issues is data, be it for analytics,
modelling or incident investigations. This emphasis on data
can also be witnessed in other key work, most notably in a
research agenda [21] for cyber risk and cyber insurance that
is advocated by insurers and academics. Here, the authors call
for research into what data should be used to assess risk and
to prioritise assets, and also highlight the need for discussion
around what cyber-related data-collection standards (that could
drive insurance and risk analysis) would actually look like.
Although limited, there have been efforts to clearly define
the data used in cyber insurance. ENISA, for instance, recog-
nising the challenges in reasoning on cyber risk without a
shared understanding, have called for harmonisation of risk-
assessment language used in cyber insurance [17]. Within
their report, they outline a few activities and data types
involved in the insurance process, including assessing industry
characteristics, audit reports and security control sets. Another
noteworthy contribution to the field is the Cyber Exposure
Data Schema proposed by the Cambridge Centre of Risk
Studies and RSM [9]. This provides an open resource to allow
the capture, modelling and reporting of exposure (impacts)
emerging from cyber incidents.
Where our research differs, and thus adds novelty, if com-
pared to the two aforementioned articles, is the focus on
identifying specifically the variety of data types used within
the cyber insurance underwriting and claims processes. This
work therefore has a wider, albeit more high-level, remit
than the Cyber Exposure Schema, and it is more directed on
data than ENISA’s harmonisation work. Therefore, the work
presented in this paper is compatible with these other articles,
and may well provide avenues for future research.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows.
Section II presents the methodology we adopt to conduct
our research study, and thereby address our research aim.
Next, in Section III we present and discuss the results of
the study, considering the data currently used within cyber
insurance as well as the additional data that insurers in cyber-
related policies would like to have. Finally, we summarise our
research and outline avenues for future work in Section IV.
II. METHODOLOGY
To address the aims of this research, we conducted a focus
group study with cyber insurers. Focus groups are an excellent
way to explore a topic by promoting group discussion as
applied to specific questions or problems. In our case, we
were interested in engaging with professionals within the cyber
insurance industry on the topic of the data that they use,
or would like to have access to, in making decisions about
underwriting a cyber risk and processing an insurance claim.
We prepared a series of questions targeted at this aim and
grouped these into two broad categories:
• The types of data gathered at significant points in the
cyber insurance process: These points can include data
gathered on the insurance applicant (client) before un-
derwriting a cyber risk, during the policy period, and in
the event of a cyber-insurance claim. We also sought to
explore the types of data that are not currently gathered
but would be ideal for insurers to have. Developing
an understanding of these various kinds of data is an
essential component in conducting research in the field
of cyber insurance, and creating updates or enhancements
to existing platforms and solutions.
• The feasibility and utility of creating a pre-competitive
dataset within the cyber insurance industry: This dataset
could provide a shared platform for making cyber in-
surance decisions (e.g., the value of a risk being un-
derwritten) and thus broadly advance the efforts of the
entire industry, while providing a basis for ongoing cyber-
insurance research.
The focus group was designed to last 90 minutes and to
be facilitated in a physical location convenient to the cyber-
insurance professionals who participated. We audio recorded
the session to allow transcription at a later date, and thereby
provide a richer pool of data for analysis. The thematic data
analysis approach ([8]) was adopted to allow us to assess
the content, identify key codes (i.e., discrete information
communicated in the text) and from these codes, construct
themes (sets of related codes) based on participants’ responses.
These themes were used to extract key findings and form
conclusions.
Given the aim of this study, it was imperative to recruit
an experienced set of cyber-insurance professionals. We were
assisted in this task by a series of research and project contacts,
who generally adhered to snowball sampling principles. This
study received ethical approval through the university’s IRB
panel, all participants were informed of the purpose of the
study and were asked to give consent prior to participation.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Cyber insurance participants
In total, a diverse group of 12 professionals from various
stages of the cyber-insurance process agreed to participate
in the study. These individuals were based in the UK but
engaged with cyber insurance portfolios both nationally and
internationally, particularly in the US (which is currently the
global largest market). Specifically, the focus group consisted
of: three underwriters (professionals involved in assessing a
cyber risk and determining whether to write a policy and at
what premium); two actuaries (experts in measuring cyber risk
and predicting financial impacts), two claims specialists (those
who take the lead in determining whether an insurance claim
arising from a cyber incident should be paid, and calculate
the appropriate amount); two cyber training specialists (pro-
fessionals who train client companies and cyber insurers about
cyber risk management); a breach response specialist (person-
nel who focus on supporting clients in immediate response
3activities after a cyber incident has occurred); and three cyber
operations experts (individuals specialising in various parts of
operations within cyber insurance companies more generally).
Thus, we effectively had all of the roles partaking in cyber
insurance procedures represented in our focus group. It is
worth noting that this group of insurers engages with various
segments of the insurance market spanning from very large
to small clients and have experience with processing requests
for large claims as well. This is advantageous as it provides
insights pertaining to how insurers interact with different types
of businesses and the different types of data they need for these
cases.
B. Types of data gathered during the cyber insurance process
1) Data gathered in order to determine whether to under-
write a cyber risk: To set the foundation for the discussions,
the first question posed focused on the data currently gathered
by insurers about potential client businesses in order to de-
termine their level of risk, and thus decide whether the client
should be offered a policy (or at what premium). The responses
to this question revolved around typical organisational charac-
teristics such as turnover, headcount, number of (or whether)
personal records held, and sector/industry. Headcount was one
of the most interesting data points suggested; this was because
it was viewed as a way to indicate the size of the corporation’s
IT estate, and thus its potential attack surface (e.g., likelihood
to be targeted by phishing attacks or potential for human error).
The organisation’s sector was also important to identify
because it indicated whether certain specific regulations or
procedures apply. For instance, a US healthcare business
would need to comply with the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA), whereas for a manufacturing
organisation, an insurer may be more interested in the setup
of various Operational Technology (OT) and Information
Technology (IT) systems.
Security-related information, as might be expected, also fea-
tured heavily in participants’ responses; especially responses
from underwriters. This spanned from basic data such as
whether the company had a Chief Information Security Officer
(CISO) and the extent to which employees received cyberse-
curity training, to more detailed information on IT/security
setup, and the business’ dependence on outsourced service
providers. According to participants, these factors hinted at
areas of significance when assessing the enterprise’s capability
(e.g., the presence of a CISO suggests the organisation may
be more invested in cybersecurity practices), understanding of
human cyber-risk (e.g., the focus on the human element with
cyber training), and judging the potential for risks to the IT
infrastructure (e.g., complexity of IT structure and dependence
on external parties).
There was specific mention of checks for security controls
such as firewalls and antivirus, and the frequency with which
the organisation updated and patched its systems. External
network scans, for example those offered by companies such
as BitSight [6] and SecurityScorecard [37], were also used
to gain an external, independent view of the security of the
enterprise’s infrastructure.
To complement these factors, claims specialists highlighted
that loss history (analogous to works that capture cyber
harm [1, 3]) and the claims that these companies had made,
if any, were also relevant factors. These would provide more
insight into the organisation including its previous or current
security practices and challenges, and their responses to them.
In addition, participants were keen to stress that many
other unquantifiable factors and data were important to the
cyber-risk identification process. According to a cyber training
specialist:
“... and a lot of the decision-making process is
unquantifiable because it’s to do with the interview
process and the responses you’re getting from the
CISO who is responsible. The point is that the
unquantifiable stuff is at least as important as the
quantifiable stuff.”
Examples of unquantifiable factors included: the experience
of the cyber insurer; the way that the potential client answers
questions posed by the insurer (e.g., their rigour and the
extent to which they are grounded in current, as opposed to
dated, technology); and the client’s use of certain services over
others (for instance, specialised legal counsel was viewed by
insurers as more helpful after a breach than general counsel,
and as such this would be a factor to consider depending
on the client’s responses). While slightly different, many of
these aspects can be linked to the experience of the insurer
and therefore demonstrate some tacit knowledge that may be
difficult to capture in any underwriting modelling approach
(particularly a computational one).
Beyond the consideration of specific data types, two other
high-level themes emerged during our study. The first was
introduced by an underwriter and centred on the reality that in
addition to industry type, the amount of data gathered depends
immensely on the size of the client’s company. This is a key
aspect as it highlights the fact that different market segments
may be approached differently by insurers.
For smaller organisations (e.g., Small-to-Medium-sized En-
terprises (SMEs)) for instance, it was perceived that there
are too many possible clients, therefore it is overwhelming
to collect detailed data and conduct formative assessments
for each one. Furthermore, it is an extremely competitive
cyber insurance market and these types of businesses will
perceive such scrutiny as an obstacle for purchasing a policy.
In such scenarios insurers may end having access to only
basic information such as the proposal forms (e.g., [41])
provided by the company. This is very different to larger
organisations where there is a stronger argument for more
extensive data gathering (e.g., meetings with CISOs, reports
and detailed presentations on the security of the organisation)
considering the higher level of the risk being underwritten.
One participant from the claims team expressed this point
clearly when speaking about smaller organisations:
“There’s a bit of a commercial trade off here on
the amount of detail you go into the application
form because if you ask too many questions, it’s too
onerous, but if you don’t ask enough questions it
comes back to bite you.”
4The second theme relates to the first and pertains to the
business element of the market. Participants deemed that the
types of data mentioned above are useful and can help in
making decisions, however, assessing the risk level or the
security posture of a company ultimately has an element of
subjectivity. This inherent subjectivity in defining risk may
represent a potential future cost to the insurer; that is, it
is a potential cost not a definite one. Often, according to
the participant, insurers will underwrite the risk—unless it
is clearly unacceptable—and put several protective measures
around it to secure the business. This suggests that in some
cases, the need to increase business (e.g., clients, revenue,
etc.) can outweigh the need to make the ‘perfect’ underwriting
decision. This fact is important especially as it focuses on the
reality of market forces instead of a drive for perfection.
We also provided to participants the opportunity to think
about and propose data that is not currently gathered, but
which might be helpful to them when making their decisions
on the cyber security posture of an organisation.
Overall, participants’ responses to this question concen-
trated mainly on the security features of the organisation and
on obtaining further insight into such processes. In particular,
there was a desire to know more about the training and
awareness measures undertaken to protect against threats (and
human errors), and the extent to which backups were created,
maintained and tested. These factors suggested a primary
focus on the human side of risk (given that it was viewed
as a gateway to numerous current attacks) and the ability of
businesses to recover from incidents (with suitable backups).
One participant, a breach response expert, also suggested
that external assessments (e.g., reports from penetration testing
companies) would be ideal to have access to, as they provided
an independent security review of the organisation. While
these might not be trusted fully (as they was not commissioned
by the insurers themselves), it could provide additional input
to the decision process.
Another aspect mentioned pertained to understanding more
about the business’ plans over the upcoming year. For instance,
plans to migrate IT systems to the cloud, to update IT systems,
to change primary firewalls, or to acquire other organisations;
if such plans exist, insurers were interested in what protec-
tive activities are introduced in these cases. One underwriter
commented:
“We’re just told that [something may happen] and
no information about what’s actually going on; let’s
say it’s a migration to the cloud or M&A [Mergers
and Acquisitions] activity and they are interacting
with another company, we need to know what that
process is, what the road map is, any rollback
contingency plans in place.”
This suggests that insurers currently may receive general
information, but not at the level where they can adequately
understand the risk involved. This is an interesting point
considering the rate at which an underwritten cyber risk could
change depending on the specifics of any of the aforemen-
tioned changes (e.g., a migration of systems to the cloud).
In discussing the topic of IT systems, one actuary suggested
that it would be ideal to be able to have more insight into
organisational processes and dependencies, in order to allow
insurers to better consider risk aggregation in decision making.
Specifically:
“If you’re an insurance company and you’ve written
a thousand policies, the key issue for us is getting
what services they are using, what providers, do they
all have Amazon Web Services, and how reliant are
they on it.”
This perspective focuses on the underlying requirement for
insurers to understand more about how client organisations
work. This is not only for defining value at risk and premiums,
but also to elucidate systemic risk across their client insurance
portfolio. Systemic risk is a crucial concern for insurers and
has been explored in detail in various reports [16, 19, 35].
There were also calls for more information due to ambi-
guities in proposal forms returned by potential clients. The
wording of these forms was, at times, viewed as too rigid and
not flexible enough to cater for large numbers of organisations.
This would be particularly important during engagement with
smaller organisations, where proposal forms are a primary
method of data gathering to make decisions on risk exposure.
For instance, a question may ask, “Do you perform penetration
tests on a quarterly basis? Yes / No”. This can, on occasion,
force a company to select No’ even if they perform tests more
regularly; this can therefore be contrary to what the question
is aiming to assess.
Moreover, according to one underwriter, standardised forms
from some brokers may focus on topics not relevant to all
clients. An example was provided that suggests that most of
the forms currently concentrate on privacy (likely largely due
to related laws and regulations such as the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation [18]) and business interruption. However,
this emphasis may be unsuitable for some organisations, e.g.,
a proposal form with many privacy questions is arguably not
best suited for a manufacturer.
The last point raised offered a different opinion and sug-
gested that while having a good understanding about security
controls was useful, it would be better to know about the
effectiveness of the company’s controls at addressing the risk
they face. Summing up the point, a cyber operations specialist
said:
“For me, a lot of this is around effectiveness. All
these things we are talking about, are they effective,
so is training effective? If you have a training
programme in place and it’s busy, it’s automated
and yet it isn’t working and in fact staff are failing
more phishing tests. So, it might tick a box on the
proposal form that says, yep we got an automated
cyber awareness training, brilliant, but it doesn’t
then say that everyone’s failing it and failing it more
and more each time.”
This is a salient point as it highlights the fact that security is
more than the presence of controls, it must also consider their
effectiveness. It further raises the question of how effectiveness
can best be assessed; should companies be required to capture
and present this information, or should effectiveness be part
of a larger framework, such as one that would compose a
5pre-competitive cyber insurance dataset? In the former case,
one participant expressed that it might be difficult to achieve
this as it could, in effect, ‘show up’ CISOs/IT managers
that are not performing well. Given that they are often the
ones with whom insurance brokers and underwriters interact,
such company representatives would be increasingly reluctant
to share security-control effectiveness information. Finally,
there is the reality that while controls, tools and training
may demonstrate increased effectiveness (e.g., more intrusions
blocked or reduced phishing click rates), attackers only need
to be successful once to compromise systems [33].
2) Data gathered between writing a policy and its renewal:
The next area we explored considered the data gathered by
insurers on their clients in the period between writing the
policy and its renewal (typically 12 months later). In general,
participants mentioned that only minimal amounts of data was
gathered at this stage, if any. The most common information
of interest to underwriters and claims specialists was whether
there were material changes to the client’s business, and in
particular whether the client organisation acquired any other
companies or whether they were acquired by others. While this
tended to be the standard way of monitoring changes to clients
in the insurance industry, this was also an area of concern
because of the thresholds set before clients were obliged to
notify insurers. As one cyber underwriter stated:
“It depends on the broker, the only ones [causes for
insurer notification] that are written into the policy
are changes in the controls if they are acquired
or acquire someone else but you normally have a
threshold for that, so 15% or so of your revenues
and if it’s under that then they’re not obliged to tell
us during the policy period.”
This suggests that information on risk may be lacking
during this period, as one might imagine a situation where,
for example, two million-dollar organisations merge, and due
to their similar sizes, the 15% revenue difference threshold
is not met. As such, there may be no updates provided
to the insurer. According to participants, there are also no
contractual requirements for such a notification/update during
the policy (unless clauses have been specific, e.g., pertaining
to thresholds). Acquisitions can also be important to examine
from the perspective of the risk profiles of organisations. As
described by one underwriter:
“... say a university acquires a payment processor
which would change the risk profile quite dramati-
cally but [as] they [i.e., the payment processor] are
tiny, you might not even know because it wouldn’t
trigger that acquisition threshold in the policy.”
This raises a crucial point linked to how dynamically
and significantly risk profiles of organisations can change
during the lifetime of a policy, without the knowledge of the
insurers who have underwritten that risk. When questioned
about whether there was an opportunity to gather more data
on client operations in the process leading up to a policy
renewal, participants mentioned that it was possible but also
challenging. One underwriter noted that it was not uncommon
to receive policy renewal applications, via a broker, from large
client organisations that only checked whether the organisation
had changed their business or had any claims in the last
12 months. This hinted at the challenges of working with
insurance brokers, who can often act as the gatekeepers and
primary interface to some clients, and to the industry more
fundamentally considering the fact that if not reviewed, cyber
risk can change significantly over such long periods. An
underwriter picked up on exactly this point with the comment:
“The thing about cyber is that if a company hasn’t
made any changes or improvements in 12 months,
that should lead to a premium increase because the
risk is very different.”
However, and as highlighted earlier, the business compo-
nent often mediates such decisions, with another underwriter
quickly interjecting and stating that the insurer would never
be able to implement or follow through with that. The first
underwriter then continued:
“But then, there’s the side from a business or a
competitive market standpoint: if a company comes
in and says: no changes for the last 12 months.
Then, we put the premium up 5 or 10% because they
haven’t made any positive changes, then we will lose
the business because someone will just underwrite it
at the price that we did last year. So, there is that
side of it as well.”
The difficulty in such cases therefore resides not only in
identifying and gathering appropriate data about a client and
their potential value at risk, but also in balancing this with
the need to remain competitive in the market. This tension
is an intriguing one noting how quickly risks can change.
Ultimately, it may also mean that actual client risk profiles
may not accurately align to how that risk is viewed on an
insurer’s books (and also reflected in the premiums charged).
Similar to our previous section, we allowed participants to
suggest data that is not currently gathered during this period,
but which they regarded as of interest to them. This resulted in
a largely homogeneous set of responses, including progress on
planned system or process migrations (e.g., system updates, IT
changes, migrations of data to other platforms), and updates
on security training activities. Some participants were keen to
discover more about the security maturity of the organisation
and how they responded to security developments (including
incidents). To sum it up, a breach response specialist com-
mented:
“More information on the wins and losses and how
they handle them; and how they get systems back up
and running and how effective are they at doing that
most of the time.”
This is noteworthy as it suggests an appetite — at least
for some part of the insurer community — for data on effec-
tiveness of security mechanisms and processes. The benefit in
such cases is that they appreciate the reality of data breaches
and therefore concentrate on response capabilities as well.
3) Data gathered after a cyber incident: To further expand
our understanding of data gathered by insurers, we then moved
to consider what data was gathered after an incident. It was
clear from responses that in the event of a claim, insurers
6were able to gather a significant amount of data about the
organisation. This could span follow-up questions in line with
the proposal forms (that were gathered before underwriting
the risk) to compare those statements with actual activities,
changes in systems, who has been contacted/involved in
dealing with the incident, what exactly has occurred and any
associated costs. These were aptly summarised by one cyber
insurance claims specialist:
“First and foremost, the two prime responsibilities
are to try to find out as early as possible what’s
the claim going to cost so that we can reserve and
to find out enough information to confirm or deny
coverage as early as possible.”
Another source of valuable data was the breach response
team involved in handling the incident. These teams would
provide a detailed capture of how the business is actually
operating and specific insight behind the cause and chain of
activities involved in the cyber security incident.
While data access after an incident was not a challenge,
participants highlighted that data gathering and storage was.
Typically claims would need to be first stored in a standard
market platform, and then this platform accessed to retrieve
information about the incident. The difficulty with the platform
however, was that it significantly constrained what data could
be uploaded about an incident. For instance, participants
identified that it was not possible to easily note the types of
attack or specifics of malware involved. This would instead
need to be shared over some other platform such as email.
These workarounds were viewed as less than ideal and had
further implications on the ability to search for past incidents,
and run analytics on risks (e.g., understanding what risks
clients were most exposed to within the last 12 months). This
is an area that would require further work, most likely at the
industry level.
C. The feasibility and utility of creating a pre-competitive
dataset
Having gained insight into the various types of data that
is gathered at key points in the cyber-insurance process, we
shifted our attention to investigating the feasibility and utility
of the creation of a pre-competitive dataset within the cyber-
insurance industry. The goal of this dataset would be to provide
a platform for making cyber-insurance decisions that could be
shared across industry.
When posed the question about the feasibility of the creation
of such a dataset, none of the participants felt that it would
work, nor were they comfortable in sharing the information
necessary to create it. The justification for this decision was
cited to be building and maintaining a competitive advantage,
in what is still a new market. As one underwriter made clear:
“[As a cyber insurer, you’ve] taken the risk to build
to where you are, that’s your IP at that point, that’s
your competitive advantage.”
And as emphasised by an cyber-insurance actuary:
“It’s general economics, the first adopter or first
mover advantage, given you’ve invested heavily into
being market leaders, why should you want to enable
other people to come in and compete with you
essentially?”
In discussing the feasibility of creating such a dataset
further, another participant suggested that the structure of a
pre-competitive dataset may already exist in the form of the
proposal forms (such as those summarised in research [41])
issued by insurers. These forms gather relevant data about
clients and can be shared across underwriters, and therefore, if
the client information from each completed form was collected
and placed in a database, that could form its basis. This was
an intriguing suggestion, but one that was quickly opposed by
another participant, an actuary, who highlighted the fact that
companies and even clients would not be willing to share this
data. He noted:
“I would argue that proposal forms are also pro-
prietary and you wouldn’t want to share that with
anyone ... Some of our clients don’t even want to
send us their information as their broker, let alone
share it with their re-insurers. People are insanely
protective.”
These comments also relate to earlier findings and the diffi-
culty in gathering data from clients. In this case, the challenge
was not only gathering that data but encouraging insurers to
share it (or/and other information) into a collaborative pre-
competitive dataset.
From these and other comments made during the focus
group, it was apparent that, at least based on this group,
the market may not be ready to create a pre-competitive
dataset. This is linked to the fact that insurers may have
invested significantly in becoming market leaders and that the
introduction of such a dataset would negatively impact their
efforts (i.e., either by lowering barriers to enter the market or
by exposing current market knowledge).
Although the idea of creating a pre-competitive dataset
may not be currently feasible, we were interested to gather
participants’ opinion on what types of data would be ideal to
include in such a dataset. We believe this would be useful
information to discuss in this setting considering that the
market’s opinion on such a dataset might change as time
progresses. This question resulted in a few different responses.
One cyber training specialist expressed that client sector,
turnover, number of employees and number of customers were
enough to determine 80% of the answer to how to price risk. In
his opinion, this, in addition to whether the client had a claim
or not in the past, could lead to a reasonable judgement. As
such, these data points would be crucial to a pre-competitive
dataset.
A claims specialist offered a different perspective and
suggested that the more confidential information (e.g., past
incident information, actual cost of claims and breakdown of
costs, etc.) would be more useful at making decisions at that
stage. It may therefore be possible that different levels of data
(in a pre-competitive dataset) are required at separate stages of
the process. This also, of course, needs to consider appropriate
laws, regulations and client preferences.
We further sought to explore participants’ opinions on the
extent to which data on assets, threats, harms and controls
7may feature as a part of the dataset. According to one actuary
however, the cyber insurance industry was not at that stage of
maturity as yet. In summary:
“That information may be too hard to capture be-
cause every organisation will have different types of
assets, different security setups and to standardise
that and draw meaningful conclusions from it —
we’re not at that stage yet.”
While an isolated response, this does highlight a real
challenge behind gathering such a dataset and standardising
it to the point that analytics can be performed by sector, size
or other enterprise characteristics. Focusing specifically on
security controls, we also sought to explore which controls
participants viewed as the most effective, and would, for in-
stance positively impact their decision of taking on a particular
risk. There were various responses to this question including
cybersecurity training, regular penetration testing, network
segmentation, multifactor authentication, dual verification of
payments, and data monitoring and control. The most common
response however was in the organisation’s ability to respond
to a cyber incident. One actuary commented:
“It’s not if it’s when, it’s how you handle post
breach. Have you got a PR statement prepared? How
do you minimise the damage?”
To build on this, participants stressed the importance of
practising incident response and rehearsing how to respond
in such cyber incident situations. This included identifying
appropriate communication messages and settings. It was
clear that members of the focus group were aware of the
pervasiveness of attackers and the high likelihood of eventual
breaches. These are all common principles that can be found
in most cyber incident response or resilience playbooks.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Cyber insurance is still a field in its infancy, and as such,
there are several open questions pertaining to assessing cyber
risk, encouraging cyber insurance adoption, calculating risk
exposure, writing policies, and supporting claims and business
recovery. This paper has contributed to the field by providing
new insight into the types of data which cyber-insurance
practitioners use on a daily basis to conduct their business.
While our work has primarily engaged with UK-based par-
ticipants, their experience with global portfolios means that
our findings are relevant for all geographical areas. This is
important given how quickly the cyber insurance market is
expanding worldwide.
From our analysis of the focus group data, we identified a
large range of data types gathered by insurers, and reported
these within the main stages in which they are used. For
instance, before a risk is underwritten, insurers are likely to
be interested in security related information such as whether
the company has a CISO and the extent to which employees
received cybersecurity training. At the claim stage, the amount
of information gathered can drastically increase and is often
an opportunity to clarify key assertions made earlier in the
process.
Throughout this data exploration exercise, it became ap-
parent that generally cyber underwriters have a challenging
task balancing the gathering of data from clients. If too much
data is requested clients (or potential clients) may choose a
competitor but if too little data is requested, it may increase
the risk to the insurer. Claims specialists also have challenges
to overcome even though after an incident they do receive a
significant amount of data. A primary issue here is to have
in place the systems meant to capture data, and to design the
platforms where data can be easily searched and analysed.
On the topic of the creation of a pre-competitive dataset,
participants did not view this favourably. Their perspective was
motivated by the impact of such a dataset on the competitive
advantage. There was also the question of exactly what such
a dataset would contain. While some individuals provided
suggestions, these did not always align and such conflicts
clearly represent the challenge of creating a pre-competitive
dataset at present.
This work provides directions for several avenues of future
work. The first involves expanding upon this research with
a large-scale survey with cyber-insurance practitioners. Focus
groups provide a perfect opportunity to explore topics in detail,
however surveys allow such insights to be expanded upon and,
to some extent, generalised. In particular, it would be valuable
to use surveys to further explore the extent of the identified
challenges to, and gaps in, current data collection and the
reasons behind them. This could inform potential solutions
that align with the capacity and requirements of the insurance
community. We could also aim to examine in more detail the
various market segments that exist, and how data use and
needs by insurers may vary across these segments. It was clear
from our work that larger organisations are subject to more
exhaustive data requests however, we are yet to explore what
specific types of data may be preferred by insurers depending
on a company’s market segment.
A second area of research could focus on operationalising
the data points mentioned (and any other data points that
can be discovered), through the definition of a comprehen-
sive model or end-to-end cyber-insurance process. This could
specify key inputs and outputs, which can impact risk exposure
and premiums. Such models or processes can be immensely
valuable for research (i.e., in providing insights where aca-
demic and research efforts may be concentrated), but may be
against the preferences of cyber insurers — this links to the
resistance to the creation of a pre-competitive dataset.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was sponsored by AXIS Insurance Company,
whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] I. Agrafiotis, J. R. C. Nurse, M. Goldsmith, S. Creese, and D. Upton.
A taxonomy of cyber-harms: Defining the impacts of cyber-attacks and
understanding how they propagate. Journal of Cybersecurity, 4(1), 10
2018.
[2] AON. Prepare for the expected: Safeguarding
value in the era of cyber risk, 2019. URL:
https://www.aon.com/emea/c-suite/cyber-risk/default.aspx.
8[3] L. Axon, A. Erola, I. Agrafiotis, M. Goldsmith, and S. Creese. Analysing
cyber-insurance claims to design harm-propagation trees. In Interna-
tional Conference On Cyber Situational Awareness, Data Analytics And
Assessment (Cyber SA), pages 1–4. IEEE, 2019.
[4] Barclay Simpson. Cyber insurance: Are UK businesses avoiding
coverage?, 2018. URL: https://www.barclaysimpson.com/blogs/cyber-
insurance-are-uk-businesses-avoiding-coverage-82463141027.
[5] C. Biener, M. Eling, and J. H. Wirfs. Insurability of cyber risk: An
empirical analysis. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues
and Practice, 40(1):131–158, 2015.
[6] BitSight. Security ratings leader - cyber risk management, 2020. URL:
https://www.bitsight.com/.
[7] R. Bo¨hme and G. Kataria. Models and measures for correlation in
cyber-insurance. In Workshop on the Economics of Information Security
(WEIS), 2006.
[8] V. Braun and V. Clarke. Using thematic analysis in psychology.
Qualitative research in psychology, 3(2):77–101, 2006.
[9] Centre for Risk Studies. Cyber exposure data
schema, 2017. URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-
research/centres/risk/publications/technology-and-space/cyber-exposure-
data-schema/e.
[10] D. R. Cohen and R. D. Anderson. Insurance coverage for” cyber-losses”.
Tort & Insurance Law Journal, pages 891–927, 2000.
[11] S. Dambra, L. Bilge, and D. Balzarotti. Sok: Cyber insurance-technical
challenges and a system security roadmap. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP), pages 293–309, 2020.
[12] DCMS. Cyber security breaches survey 2019, 2019. URL:
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-
survey-2019.
[13] DCMS. Cyber security breaches survey 2020, 2020. URL:
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/cyber-security-breaches-
survey-2020.
[14] Deloitte. Overcoming challenges to cyber insurance growth,
2020. URL: https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/financial-
services/cyber-insurance-market-growth.html.
[15] B. Dupont. The cyber-resilience of financial institutions: significance
and applicability. Journal of Cybersecurity, 5(1):tyz013, 2019.
[16] EastWest Institute. Cyber insurance and systemic market risk, 2019.
URL: https://www.eastwest.ngo/cyberinsurance.
[17] ENISA. Commonality of risk assessment language in cyber insurance,
2017. URL: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/commonality-of-
risk-assessment-language-in-cyber-insurance.
[18] European Parliament and Council of the European Union.
General data protection regulation (gdpr), 2016. URL:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj.
[19] European Systemic Risk Board. Systemic cyber risk,
2020. URL: https://www.esrb.europa.eu/news/pr/date/2020/html/
esrb.pr200219 61abad5f20.en.html.
[20] European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Cyber In-
surance: Recent Advances, Good Practices and Challenges, 2016.
URL: https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/cyber-insurance-recent-
advances-good-practices-and-challenges.
[21] Falco et al. A research agenda for cyber risk and cyber insurance. In
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2019.
[22] J. Figg. Cyber insurance to cover e-business. Internal Auditor, 57(4):13–
13, 2000.
[23] U. Franke. The cyber insurance market in sweden. Computers &
Security, 68:130–144, 2017.
[24] L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, and T. Sohail. A framework for using
insurance for cyber-risk management. Communications of the ACM,
46(3):81–85, 2003.
[25] Hiscox. Cyber readiness report 2019, 2019.
[26] Insurance Journal. AXIS Launches Cyber Center of
Excellence to Help Mitigate Cyber Risks, 2018. URL:
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/04/
16/486481.htm.
[27] M. M. Khalili, P. Naghizadeh, and M. Liu. Designing cyber insurance
policies: The role of pre-screening and security interdependence. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 13(9):2226–2239,
2018.
[28] I. Linkov and A. Kott. Fundamental concepts of cyber resilience:
Introduction and overview. In Cyber resilience of systems and networks,
pages 1–25. Springer, 2019.
[29] Marsh. 2019 cyber catalyst designations:
17 cybersecurity solutions, 2019. URL:
https://www.marsh.com/us/services/cyber-risk/cyber-catalyst.html.
[30] Marsh and UK Government. UK cyber security: the role of
insurance in managing and mitigating the risk, 2015. URL:
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-cyber-security-the-
role-of-insurance.
[31] P. H. Meland, I. A. Tøndel, M. Moe, and F. Seehusen. Facing uncertainty
in cyber insurance policies. In International Workshop on Security and
Trust Management, pages 89–100. Springer, 2017.
[32] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST Cyberse-
curity Framework, 2018. URL: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework.
[33] J. R. C. Nurse. Cybercrime and you: How criminals attack and the
human factors that they seek to exploit. In The Oxford Handbook of
Cyberpsychology. OUP, 2019.
[34] OECD. Enhancing the role of insurance in cyber risk manage-
ment, 2017. URL: https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/Enhancing-
the-Role-of-Insurance-in-Cyber-Risk-Management.pdf.
[35] RAND Corporation. Systemic cyber risk and aggregate impacts, 2020.
URL: https://www.rand.org/pubs/working papers/WR1311.html.
[36] S. Romanosky, L. Ablon, A. Kuehn, and T. Jones. Content analysis of
cyber insurance policies: how do carriers price cyber risk? Journal of
Cybersecurity, 5(1), 2019.
[37] SecurityScorecard. Cybersecurity ratings & risk analysis, 2020. URL:
https://securityscorecard.com.
[38] S. A. Talesh. Data breach, privacy, and cyber insurance: How insurance
companies act as compliance managers for businesses. Law & Social
Inquiry, 43(2):417–440, 2018.
[39] The New York Times. Big companies thought insurance
covered a cyberattack. they may be wrong., 2019. URL:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/technology/cyberinsurance-
notpetya-attack.html.
[40] I. Vakilinia and S. Sengupta. A coalitional cyber-insurance framework
for a common platform. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 14(6):1526–1538, 2018.
[41] D. Woods, I. Agrafiotis, J. R. C. Nurse, and S. Creese. Mapping the
coverage of security controls in cyber insurance proposal forms. Journal
of Internet Services and Applications, 8(1):8, 2017.
[42] D. Woods, T. Moore, and A. Simpson. The county fair cyber loss
distribution: Drawing inferences from insurance prices. In Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS), 2019.
